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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

PROBLEM

1. To recommend next steps in the problem of intelligence support for psychological warfare.

BACKGROUND

2. In an interchange of correspondence between the DCI, Mr. Jackson and the Department of State it was recognized that the primary responsibility for intelligence support for psychological warfare rested with the Department.

3. The problem of State Department funds and personnel was gone into at that time as one will note from the letters and the difficulties of State Department finances in this respect were recognized; however, the Agency did not in fact supply any funds since the Department never formally made the request.

4. In June 1951 this Office disseminated a paper entitled, "Intelligence Support for Psychological Operations," which was the result of a survey by this Office of both those engaged in psychological warfare operations and in the production of intelligence relevant to such operations and planning. While it was never formally approved every effort was made to obtain criticism and there remained no basic point with which any agency was in disagreement. (This paper is attached as TAB A)

5. The State Department's plans, which originally included about 40 people to be added to the staff of OIR for psychological intelligence support, came to an early end because of budget difficulties. The International Information Administration (IIA) secured funds for its intelligence support but insisted that personnel paid by such funds in OIR would be strictly accountable to IIA needs. Prior to this arrangement for IIA funds substantial gains were made in that Melville Ruggles, then coordinator in the Department, was moving out aggressively with the other agencies. Since that time little has been accomplished in this respect. In some instances OIR has accepted DD/P requests and the deadlines have not yet come to pass. In other cases OIR has declined DD/P requests as either inappropriate for them or beyond their resources.

6. The State Department has been concerned about its financial inability to meet its recognized responsibility and considered in recent months writing to the Director and requesting funds to meet its obligation in the community. Such a letter was never sent.

Psychological warfare

7. The Defense member on the Psychological Operations Committee (POC) has recently, on August 22, submitted the paper, SPDM 359-52 (TAB B), recommending the fixation, at the national level, of continuing responsibilities for intelligence support to psychological warfare. Admiral Stevens and General Magruder in the POC in the summer of 1950 raised the same question and proposed this responsibility was CIA's. At a meeting attended by Mr. Jackson he stated the position of the Agency on this question (see memorandum of conversation which Jackson approved - TAB C).

8. DD/I has recently initiated with DD/P a study by their representatives of the problem of intelligence support for DD/P operations, with the understanding that provision of such support might in fact require an intelligence arm of DD/P comparable to G-2 for the Army or R for the State Department. Presumably such an intelligence arm would provide some support to DD/P psychological warfare.

DISCUSSION

9. In talking over the General Balzer proposal with the DD/OIR, I have referred to the OIC paper of June 21 and asked whether there is any reason to doubt the validity of the analysis as set forth. I have also done the same with OIS (Shaffer) in DD/P. I am very doubtful that a survey of the problem would uncover facts which would materially add to a solution to the problem.

10. I have pointed out to the State Department that if one accepts the analysis in the OIC paper, it follows that OIR already has sizeable resources devoted to certain aspects of intelligence support for psychological warfare. While it could be accepted that to do the job State Department needed substantial additions in personnel, it would^{not} require a substantial amount of money for the State Department to take some step such as the establishment of an intelligence coordinating group. This might, in fact, relieve such complaints as General Balzer's. It should produce very beneficial results in bringing the interested elements in the community together and providing liaison and exchange of information. One suggestion was that this be a Watch Committee type group to carry out the Balzer terms of reference.

State was
11. While at first negative to this suggestion, I have since been informed by the DD/OIR that State is interested in this proposal.

12. At the moment I am convinced that certain acts, as recommended below, would get us on with solving the problem and would provide a better climate.

RECOMMENDATION

13. That the State Department be invited to submit proposed terms of reference for an IAC subcommittee on intelligence support for psychological warfare, the terms of reference to be initially proposed by the State Department and discussed among the agencies prior to presentation at the IAC. This Office might be designated to bring Agency interests into such discussion.

14. That the Director announce to the IAC that he is assigning a full time officer (placed in OIC) to assist in working out problems raised by any member, which cannot be satisfactorily handled by the Committee.

15. He should request the IAC members to inform the operational and planning offices in the field of psychological warfare, in their respective agencies, of these actions.